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Abstract. The study of “A History of U.S.S.R Encroachment on Afghanistan and the Developments in 
U.S Foreign Policy” will examine the significant point towards Afghan internal situation, 
particularly towards the Afghanistan’s political situation, Soviet initial reluctant policies towards 
Afghanistan and eventually rapid changes in U.S.S.R policy in the form of encroachment on 
Afghanistan. Furthermore, this imperative study will evaluate the U.S foreign policy towards Soviet 
encroachment on Afghanistan, revenge to Soviet Union on Vietnam War, use of CIA for aiding to 
Afghan insurgents and the key role of U.S decision makers.  Finally, we will discuss the U.S winning 
points of this US-Soviet Cold War. This study has been distributed in three main parts, first part of 
study will discuss about the Afghanistan’s internal and political situation, second part of study will 
evaluate the Soviet’s initial reluctant policies towards Afghanistan and further discussion about the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. U.S interests towards Central Asia, U.S foreign policy towards 
U.S.S.R encroachment of Afghanistan and critical steps in U.S foreign policy will be discussed in the 
third part of this study and furthermore, in the third part, we will discuss about the Brazanki’s 
interview in which he accepted the U.S hidden role in Cold War and supporting Afghanistan’s 
insurgents against the U.S.S.R. 
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Afghanistan in Historical Context 
Afghan territory is a landlocked at about 250,000 square miles, which is situated 
near the Iran upland, subcontinent of India and Central Asia. The borders of 
Afghanistan also touch with Iran in west, Pakistan in southeast, Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan in north and China in east side (Younossi & Nadiri, 
2008). The total area of Afghanistan is 647497 square kilometers but it is a little 
smaller than Pakistan (Jalalzai, 1999; 16). The shape of Afghanistan is same as fry 
pan. This slightness of the Afghanistan recognized as Wakhan corridor which was 
sculpted by Britain administration to stop the U.S.S.R for involvement towards 
Indian subcontinent.  
The contemporary Afghanistan’s kingdom was established in 1747 (Wahab & 
Youngerman, 2007). During 1893, the boundaries between Britain administration 
and U.S.S.R were demarcated and an agreement on Oxus River was signed between 
both powers, in which they accepted that the said river is in North region of 
Afghanistan (Qaeem, 2008). Afghan territory is situated at tri-junction of almost 
four tactical states and also famous as region of cross roads and this region is 
known as trade route between South, West and Central Asia from various centuries. 
Pakistan explicitly deals with whatsoever power existed on land to ease the 
improvements and advancements of trading with Central region of Asia (Rubin, 
1995). The slump of U.S.S.R and oil sources of Central Asia considerably changed 
the geopolitical environment of the region. Therefore, the Afghan region gets the 
illustrative importance as land bridge for trade route, gas and oil trading. In the 
current era, Central Asian countries have known as golden routes for energy 
savings and Afghanistan is a prime hub for this purpose. 
Afghanistan’s Political Environment  
Although Afghanistan has a key position in Central Asia and this region also has a 
complex level decentralization disability so various external actor’s invaded and 
interfere in the region. Afghanistan is also known as graveyard of empires. Almost 
three decades of war in this region, it has showed the intricate tangle of linguistic, 
religious, tribal, ethnicity and also threat for national and global levels. 
3                                             Journal of Studies in Social Sciences 
 
Furthermore, during 1970s, Afghanistan suffered from the revolution of 
socialization and in 1978, People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PADA) 
controlled the state as social state and Nur Muhammad Taraki was the first 
President of Afghanistan, which was backed by U.S.S.R. However, the women 
rights and land reforms of PADA administration were rejected by the Afghan nation, 
military and also by the various members of their party (Grau& Gress, 2002). 
Eventually, Taraki’s government fails in managing and controlling the territory. 
Various tribes began to create disturbance in the country, for instance, Hazara 
tribes were Shia and backed by Iran. They don’t accept the PADA reforms, and 
other non-Pushtuns were also against the government (Gupta,1986). Due to these 
troubles, during 1979, Afghan government request to his neighboring country 
Soviet Union for their help. Although the Afghanistan’s internal political, 
economical and social situation was destabilized so initially Soviet’s administration 
was reluctant to deploy their forces in the Afghan region. 
Soviet Initial Reluctant Policy and Eventual Encroachment on Afghanistan 
In the various studies, it has been pointed out that U.S.S.R already decided and has 
hidden objective during Soviet-Afghan war, so U.S.S.R administration viewed the 
encroachment on Afghan region. But this imperative study showed the new aspect 
of U.S.S.R encroachment on Afghanistan.  
Actually, U.S.S.R administration and politburo initially were disagreeing on 
Afghanistan’s encroachment. But this disinclination was dramatically changed in 
1979 during the revolts of Heart (Afghanistan) region, which provoked the disaster 
and various crises for U.S.S.R administration. In the dangerous and unstable 
situation, Government of Afghanistan requested to U.S.S.R for their help in this 
critical situation but initially Politburo refuse to interfere in Afghanistan. Finally, 
U.S.S.R administration met to judge the difficult decision of Afghanistan’s 
encroachment to safe their power in Afghanistan. The content of this transcript is 
so attractive and interesting. We can also judge through following discussion of 
U.S.S.R officials that at initial stage U.S.S.R administration was not agreed: 
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Yuri Andropov; Comrades, I have thought this issue over very 
thoroughly since yesterday and have concluded that we should 
consider very, very seriously whether it would make sense to send 
troops into Afghanistan. The economy is backward, the Islamic 
religion predominates, and nearly all of the rural population is 
illiterate. I do not think we can uphold the revolution in Afghanistan 
with the help of our bayonets. The idea is intolerable and we cannot 
risk it. 
Andrei Gromyko: I fully support Comrade Andropov’s view that we 
should exclude the dispatch of troops to Afghanistan. The Afghan 
army is unreliable and our army would become an aggressor. With 
whom will it fight?  With the Afghan people! Our Army would have to 
shoot them! To be blunt, the Afghan [communist] leaders have made 
many mistakes and haven’t got the support of their own people. 
Andrei Kirilenko; Tanks and armored vehicles cannot rescue them 
[the PDPA]. I think that we must frankly tell them that. We must say 
that we will support them to the hilt, we shall give them  all of the  
aid  that  we  have  promised  to  give , but we  cannot  send troops 
(Cordovez & Harrison, 1995). 
U.S.S.R initial unwilling policy towards encroachment of Afghanistan steadily 
changed, actually due to Afghanistan’s internal political and physical situation. 
Particularly, the U.S.S.R feel doubts about Afghan government from their past 
experiences, which was observed as inattentive and impetuous. Furthermore, 
Politburo also assumed that Amin’s administration has links with U.S 
administration. Opposite of U.S.S.R desires, PADA sustained to get the control 
during 1979, due to weaknesses in Taraki’s government and as the revolution of 
1979, Amin takeover the control from Taraki. This situation in Afghanistan was a 
big threat to U.S.S.R and their supremacy policies. Furthermore, U.S.S.R already 
feels the U.S interest towards Central Asia and feels prime threat to U.S.S.R 
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supremacy in the region so they decided to control the Afghanistan and don’t want 
to see the U.S in this region.  
Developments in U.S Foreign Policy 
It has been seen in history that after the British withdrawal from Asia, the U.S 
increased their interests towards this region and has manifold and at the same time 
contending objectives towards Central Asia. U.S consequence of his different layout 
and gigantic deposits of gas, coal, uranium, oil, this area, plays the prime element 
in U.S worldwide policy in vision of his propinquity towards U.S.S.R, Chinese, 
Indian, Pakistani, Iranian and various others major players. Furthermore, various 
scholars and historians also pointed out the lot of U.S interests towards the Central 
Asian region. So to get his hidden and supremacy objectives, U.S changed his 
foreign policy towards this region.  
The Moscow’s encroachment on Afghan region during 1979 is a major example of 
Russia’s commencement and falls in the form of U.S hopes that the U.S.S.R desire 
to move towards southern area of Warm Water and Persian Gulf. The U.S.S.R 
encroachment of Afghanistan as explained by Michael Armacost (Secretary of State) 
that; “marked the primary Russian forces encroachment since WW-II”. This was the 
prime case of Moscow’s forces encroachment well outside the momentous and 
historic encroachment way from the Western. For these causes, U.S foreign policy 
towards Afghan region was certainly labeled respond and reactive.  
U.S President Carter and his foreign policy towards Afghanistan during 1979 paved 
the path for almost ten years of U.S involvement in the U>S>S>R-Afghan war. As 
the political environment swiftly deteriorated in Afghan region during 1979 so U.S 
government and their policy makers began to consider U.S.S.R encroachment and 
their interests towards the Afghan region. Finally, Carter and his team took more 
attention to develop their comprehensive foreign policies and get their objectives 
and revenge to U.S.S.R on Vietnam War. 
U.S Initial Policy Steps 
U.S policy makers, Cyrus Vance as State Secretary and Brzezinski as National 
Security Advisor (NSA), were both agreed on Moscow’s encroachment of 
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Afghanistan and were on critical thinking about them that how to deal with 
Afghanistan’s government, which was backed by Moscow (Brzezinski, 1983: 443-54).  
The foreign policy deliberations driven by the National Security Council (NSC) as 
well as State Department under both the policy makers rose to vanguard of 
discussion on how the America finds a best solution in critical situation of Afghan’s 
region. Positive response to U.S administration leader, both were at superlative 
position to adjust the U.S foreign policy and have positive opinions on the way it 
must be getting once Taraki control the state. 
Eventually, both the policy maker’s opinions were different towards Afghan 
situation. NSA Brazanki want to significant support the rebellions and control the 
Afghan situation, on the other hand, Vance actually was waiting for. Ex-National 
Security Adviser did not want to wait more and was agreed on prompt action on 
part of the U.S. NSA Brazanki began to makes the plans for a significantly more 
hostile position through CIA to perform any imminent strategy towards Afghan 
region where as ex-State Secretary was satisfied to carry out the gesture of existing 
United State’s assistance provided to current administration (Brzezinski, 1983: 443-
54). Though, the National Security Advisor was alert to respond to the Moscow’s 
moving and actually knew that an alteration of the State Security potential should 
happen for U.S to do so. During the U.S.S.R invasion of Afghanistan, Brzezinski 
evokes how, “it does not extensively identify that throughout Carter’s era, the 
Central Intelligence Agency was controlled by National Security Council and 
Director of Security Agency had restricted approaches to President Carter office 
(Brzezinski, 1983: 443-54).” The level of NSA’s control and all endeavors were 
provided to bring about the developments in security agencies are difficult to decide, 
but security agencies’ newly discovered power was certainly used by the government 
to take away the impact of U.S strategies in Afghan region following the Moscow’s 
encroachment (Coll, 2004). 
To know the internal situation of Afghanistan, Carter’s administration sent U.S 
official (David Newsom) to Afghanistan, on his returning, the Embassy report’s to 
U.S administration about the internal political situation of Afghanistan and Vance 
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agreed to support the U.S.S.R oppositions and also it could cause negative collision 
on U.S.S.R support to Afghan government (Vance, 1983). But other higher 
authorities were not still agreed on these suggestions but after some time Vance 
resigned from his job, because he was agreed on aiding through security agencies to 
Moscow oppositions. Beside, powerful Brzezinski hold rather dissimilar views from 
his opponent on Soviet decision and present freely can put the strategy (Hilali, 
2005). Finally, U.S decided to aid the Soviet opposition for getting their objectives.   
After the decision of aiding to Afghan rebellions, CIA sends a memorandum to his 
administration during 1979 regarding the situation of Afghan region and informed 
that “Afghan rebellions are achieving the successes against the Afghan 
administration (Gates, 2007).” External actors were also interested in this U.S-
U.S.S.R cold War, for instance, Pakistan, Saudia and various other countries and 
second memorandum was send to U.S Security Council and indicated that “Saudi 
Arabia is interested in Afghan region and wants to aid the Moscow’s opposition and 
wants to encourage the Pakistani government for this purpose.” The CIA 
deliberation of their state involvement in Afghanistan lead to memorandum further 
added, “Moscow can easily support and aid to Afghan government, though we hope 
Moscow may send their forces.” Most considerably, Robert reminded about various 
regular memorandum towards Afghan situation and stressing the concepts that, “If 
Moscow decided to encroachment of Afghan territory so we can’t stop them, but 
some movements can harsh them in the area (Gates, 2007).” 
After this, a meeting was held towards Afghan internal situation, in which six 
options were given by security agency towards Afghanistan, and suggested the 
direct aiding to Afghan rebellions. And further discussed that how the CIA provided 
the more and more aiding to insurgents for opposing the Moscow forces and this 
financial support will be provided in different ways i.e. armaments, arrangements 
of trainings and others activities (Gates, 2007). At least, different kinds of support 
was recommended by U.S President (as per “Presidential Finding) for Afghan 
rebellions for opposing the Moscow forces and create various troubles for them 
(Gates, 2007). Furthermore, various other countries also played a key role in aiding 
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and supporting Mujahidin, for instance, Pakistan played a key role as bridge 
between CIA and Mujahedeen; Saudi government funneled the billions of dollars to 
Afghan insurgents (Rashid, 2001).  
U.S Critical Decisions  
However the America’s tenuous warnings and messages were overlooked by U.S.S.R 
administration. Therefore, for inceptive response to U.S.S.R on their Afghan 
encroachment and revenge of their act, was now the first priority of U.S 
administration. In the history, it has been seen that U.S policies makes during this 
Cold War’ showed the implications not only on Afghanistan or U.S.S.R but the same 
were on the peoples of U.S, East and Southern region of Asia. After these critical 
decisions, an U.S official stated that “the U.S.S.R encroachment of Afghanistan was 
big threat to U.S and other linking states and the decisions made by U.S can 
provided a prime chance to good relationship between U.S and his allies” 
(Brzezinski, 1983: 443-54). 
U.S administration views on Afghan situation pointed out the various spots which 
were so important towards the U.S reaction on U.S.S.R’s encroachment of 
Afghanistan. After some time, U.S leader again speeches towards Afghan situation 
and stated that “current talk on 2nd nuclear agreement with U.S.S.R will be 
embraced until the U.S to understand the U.S.S.R’s interests towards the Afghan 
region (Strategic Arms, 2001). 
Another important decision was also made by U.S government during the U.S.S.R 
encroachment of Afghanistan. U.S administration decided the limitation on 
U.S-U.S.S.R business by claiming that U.S is going to decrease his exporting 
business with Soviet in three main regions due to their encroachment of 
Afghanistan. The main fields were technology, machinery, fishing and graining 
fields were also warned to Soviet. Furthermore, U.S announced to boycott to 
participate in Olympic Games, which were held in U.S.S.R until they withdraw 
their forces from Afghanistan (Carter, 1980). 
U.S not only stop on boycotting of Olympic or decreasing of business but they 
further announced that, “Global reaction should be towards the internal 
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environment of Afghan region.” U.S President stated that “The U.S should reach its 
authority and leadership (Carter, 1980).” Finally, during the era of Olympic Games, 
U.S boycotts to participate in this important event (Brzezinski, 1983: 443-54). It 
was big decision and prime part of U.S foreign policy due to Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan and gets their own objectives. 
Brzezinski’s Interview  
U.S foreign policy during U.S.S.R encroachment of Afghanistan was not only on 
boycotting the games and decreasing of business or other activities but they began 
to funneled the billions of dollars to insurgent’s movements of Afghanistan and also 
makes the strong relations with neighboring countries of Afghanistan. As relating 
to provision of support to Afghan movements and secret war against the U.S.S.R, 
Brzezinski - he was the Director of CIA during the initial Soviet encroachment of 
Afghanistan- affirmed during an interview to French Le-Nouvel during 1990s. 
Brzezinski gave the significant and valuable information towards U.S foreign policy 
during Soviet-U.S Cold War and about secret operation by U.S during Afghan-
U.S.S.R conflict; the translation of interview with little amendments makes by 
“Gibbs” is as under: 
Q: The former director of the CIA, Robert Gates, stated in his 
memoirs, that the American intelligence services began to aid the 
Mujahidin in Afghanistan six months before the Soviet intervention. 
In this period you were the national security adviser to President 
Carter. You therefore played a key role in this affair. Is this correct? 
Answer by Brzezinski: Yes. According to the official version of history, 
CIA aid to the Mujahidin began during 1980, that is to say, after the 
Soviet army invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. But the 
reality, closely guarded until now, is completely otherwise: Indeed, it 
was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for 
secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And 
that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to 
Journal of Studies in Social Sciences                                                10 
 
him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military 
intervention. 
Q: Despite this risk, you were an advocate of this covert action. But 
perhaps you yourself desired this Soviet entry into war and looked for 
a way to provoke it? 
Answer by Brzezinski: It wasn’t quite like that. We didn’t push the 
Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability 
that they would. 
Q: When  the  Soviets  justified  their  intervention by  asserting that 
they  intended  to  fight  against  secret  U.S  involvement  in 
Afghanistan , nobody believed them. However, there was an element 
of truth in this. You don’t regret any of this today? 
Answer by Brzezinski: Regret what? That secret operation was an 
excellent idea. It had the  effect  of drawing  the  Russians  into  the 
Afghan  trap  and  you want me to regretit? The day that the Soviets 
officially crossed the border, I  wrote to  President  Carter, essentially: 
“We now  have the opportunity  of giving  to the  USSR its Vietnam  
war”. Indeed, for almost 10 years, Moscow had to carry on a war that 
was unsustainable for the regime, a conflict that brought about the 
demoralization and finally the breakup of the Soviet empire.  
Q: And neither do you regret having supported Islamic 
fundamentalism, which has given arms and advice to future 
terrorists?  
Answer by Brzezinski: What is more important in world history? The 
Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some agitated Moslems 
or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the cold war? 
(Gibbs, 2000: 233-45).25 
Brzezinski’s discussions were very important and have depth towards funneling of 
billions of dollars to insurgents and U.S secret war. This interview gave the various 
points towards the U.S foreign policy during this Cold War. In this discussion we 
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can easily judge that Brzezinski accepted their backing to Afghan rebellions and 
making the policy to revenge the U.S.S.R on Vietnam War. At least this secret war 
and foreign policy during this Cold War win the war, in which U.S policy makers 
played the prime role. 
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